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Abstract
This article analyzes the source of Confucian universal morality
and human dignity from the perspective of the classic saying, “what fol-
lows the dao is good, and what dao forms is nature” (jishan chengxing)
found in the Great Commentaries of the Book of Changes. From a Clas-
sical Confucian perspective, human nature is generated by the natural
dao of tian, so human dignity and morality also emerge from the natural
dao of tian. This article discusses the relationship between the Confucian
dao of tian and the moral notion of human rights which ensues from the
historical tradition of Chinese exegesis on this subject.  Specifically, the
authors reconstruct a naturalist version of Confucian morality which in-
herently motivates the beneficial outcomes generally associated with the
modern Western conception of human rights. The authors argue that such
a framework, which would draw upon Confucian “natural goodness within
human nature” differs significantly from the more commonly accepted
Mencian version of human morality dependent upon the premise that “hu-
man nature is good”.  This intra-mural differentiation within Chinese phi-
losophy can be helpful in structuring dialogue with various Western theo-
ries of human rights.
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Introduction
The search for a Confucian foundation for human rights is a grow-
ing enterprise within contemporary scholarship.  Despite the absence of a
well-defined policy of human rights in modern China, many scholars sug-
gest that there are numerous primary and comprehensible ideas related to
human rights embedded within Classical Confucianism. This article re-
constructs a naturalist version of Confucian human rights based on the
hermeneutical tradition built upon the saying within the Great Commen-
taries of the Book of Changes: “What follows the dao is good, and what
dao forms is nature” (jishan chengxing 继善成性 ).  In much the same way
the contemporary Western notion of human rights is expressed by the
United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Confucian
conception of human rights is seminally expressed in the statement that
“the benevolent people tend to love others”.  But precisely how these
two approaches should interface has eluded scholars within the circle of
comparative philosophy.  The authors of this article consider the origins
of Confucian personal rights to be the appropriate entry point for tackling
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this question.
According to Clifford Orwin, Christian morality continues in secu-
lar clothing despite Richard Rorty’s claims that the God is dead, the latest
version of Nietzsche’s famous claim that “Gott ist todt”, (Orwin, 2004:
31-2).2  The concept of morality in human rights emerged as a real global
morality in replacement of earlier formulations of theological morality
following the Second World War. The practical impetus which led to the
casting of human rights as a moral issue emanated from the United Na-
tions’ recognition of the need for an international court to judge the inhu-
mane atrocities which had scandalized Western nations.  These included
the racial genocide and war crimes of World War II, and extend to more
contemporary massacres such as in Yugoslavia in 1993 and Rwanda in
1994.  The theoretical foundation for the morality of human rights is
stated in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
declares that, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act to-
wards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”. The dual implication of
Article 1 is that every human being is born with innate dignity and that
every human being must respect the innate dignity of other human beings.
This term “innate” strongly suggests that the worth of the individual, far
from being dependent upon, actually transcends factors of race, color,
sex, language, religion, politics and social status, etc.
What elements, then, constitute the essence or foundation of the
“innate dignity” of human beings?  While the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights implies that humans are “endowed with”…”innate dig-
nity”, that document stops short of identifying or explaining the source
thereof. The pre-modern conception of an almighty creator-God has been
an historical referent for human dignity for most of the world, and theism
has also provided the foundation for the morality of human rights by vir-
tue of the West’s religious heritage (Perry, 2007: 1-6). But with today's
global pluralism and the blurring of boundaries between East and West,
an appeal to the God of any one tradition falls short of a universal stan-
dard.  For this reason, it is necessary to explore a non-religious answer
for this question.
According to Michael J. Perry, the argument for the traditional
Western morality of human rights is as follows: John 4:16 states that
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“God is love. Whoever lives in love lives in God, and God is in him”. We
are all sons and daughters of God, and we are brothers and sisters of each
other. Thus, everyone possesses innate dignity and should not be harmed;
humans should respect and love each other. It is necessary to believe that
the God creates humans not only to be brothers and sisters of each other,
but also to have union with God through love. This is not only union in an
ontological sense, but also the practical recognition that human beings
are inseparable, such that we share each other’s interests (Perry, 2007: 8-
9). In this version, human nature is created by God, and all humans as
sons and daughters of God should live as brothers and sisters. The utmost
fulfillment for human beings is to attain to unity with God through love.
In contrast, the theoretical vision of a Confucian morality of hu-
man rights is naturalist. Confucian human rights emerges from the natural
dao of tian, which differs from the foundation of theological morality
based upon the Law of God. In Confucian moral theories, a “dao’s-eye-
view” is relativistic, but it is not moral relativism. However, a “God’s-
eye-view” entails an absolute frame of reference. A Confucian theory of
moral choice needs to examine human ethical behaviors and start with
obligation or consciousness.
In fact, Confucian moral facts can involve both beliefs and de-
sires, so a Confucian theory of action can be both “motivational” and
“emotivist”. This article focuses on the hermeneutical sources for “what
follows the dao is good, and what dao forms is nature (jishan chengxing)”
in the Great Commentary of the Book of Changes, and argues that uni-
versality can be found in a Confucian naturalist morality of human rights.
Additionally, this article attempts to dialogue with Western ideas of hu-
man rights on both theoretical and practical levels.
I. Hermeneutical sources on “what follows the dao is good, and what
dao forms is nature (jishan chengxing)” in the Great Commen-
tary of the Book of Changes
Discussing some hermeneutical sources on”what follows the dao is
good, and what dao forms is nature (jishan chengxing)” in the Great
Commentary of the Book of Changes will help us to clarify the theoretical
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development from Mencius’ statement that “human nature is good”
through the Song-ming Neo-Confucian statement “from goodness to na-
ture”. This clarification is heuristic in constructing a naturalist version of
Confucian morality of human rights.
According to Xiang Shiling, when Han Kangbo commented on
The Book of Changes after Wang Bi, Han did not explain the line about
“what follows the dao is good, and what dao forms is nature (jishan
chengxing)” in the Great Commentary.  Thus, at that time, what was not
an important theoretical point for Han eventually became a fertile topic
of debate in Song-ming Neo-Confucianism. This reflects Neo-
Confucianism’s theoretical effort to construct a “natural goodness-hu-
man nature” framework from the dao of tian to the dao of human beings.
Many Neo-Confucians have worked on separating goodness from nature
(Xiang, 2008: 32-42). For example, Cheng Hao uses the line about in the
Great Commentaries to explain Mencius’ idea that human nature is good,
and he also claims that it is beyond the expression of “goodness” to de-
scribe the ontological a priori nature (Cheng, 1981: 10-1). Xiang claims
that the a priori goodness of nature becomes post-priori in the two Cheng
brothers (Xiang, 2011: 140). Cheng Yi argues the statement that “human
nature is originally good” could be taken as the “goodness of nature”
which takes goodness to be a characteristic of human nature; and his
elder brother, Cheng Hao also agrees. This paper argues that both Cheng
brothers proposed new interpretations on the Mencius’ doctrine “human
nature is good”.
Other Neo-Confucians in the Song Dyansty, like Hu Hong and
Zhang Shi, also claimed that goodness is a property attached to nature,
so goodness should not be taken as an essential character of nature. Su
Shi also claims that when dao and things meet, goodness emerges, thus,
goodness is produced naturally, so it is not viewed in a moral sense any
longer. Things naturally emerge and yin-yang naturally disappears, so
goodness is simply a stage in the creative process of heaven and earth,
that is original and ontologically grounded. Su argues that it is possible to
reason the existence of a father through his son, but one cannot infer the
existence of a son from the father. Su holds that the goodness comes from
the dao, clearly against the Mencian doctrine of taking goodness to be
nature. For Su, goodness is just an effective property of nature, but Mencius
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confuses these two, which for Su, is unacceptable. But later, Zhu Xi dis-
agrees with Su because Su takes dao and things to be two separable
aspects. Chen Chun, Zhu Xi’s student, and Xue Xuan during the Ming
Dynasty both agreed with Zhu that goodness and nature are inseparable
(Xue, 1990: 1297-8).
Keeping with the Cheng brothers’ separation of goodness and
nature, Zhu Xi claims that the natural pattern (li) is always good, and that
things within nature accept this to be the case. He applies the Zhongyong’s
separation of a priori and a posteriori to argue that, for heaven and earth,
it is goodness which precedes nature, but for humans, it is nature which
precedes goodness. Thus, Zhu claims that the “what follows the dao is
good” referring to that which is prior to birth, while for Mencius “human
nature is good” applies following birth (Zhu, 1986: 1898). Cai Qing, dur-
ing the mid-Ming Dyansty, also separated these two (Cai, 1986: 602).
His view was succeeded by Wang Fuzhi who clearly argues that “what
follows (jizhi 继之 )” means the horizon between heavens and humans, and
there is no separation between “following” and “not-following”.  Thus,
to render tian as nature places it beyond good and evil, and the source of
goodness must come after “what follows” or it will fail to be made mani-
fest. It is the human being which follows the dao of tian that is good.
Wang also claims that human life comes from the dao of the yin-yang of
heaven and earth. He claims that human nature is good because humanity
follows tian/Nature, and it does not mean that before “what follows” it is
already good. He criticizes Mencius’ “confusion” of the logical relation-
ship between the goodness which connects to nature with “human nature
is already good”, implying that Mencius takes particulars to be univer-
sals. Thus Wang rejects the Mencius claim that human nature is good
(Wang, 1988: 959).
In sum, we might argue that Neo-Confucian philosophers tran-
scend the Mencius statement that “human nature is good” by reinterpret-
ing the relationship between goodness and human nature.  This philo-
sophical breakthrough could be taken as the theoretical foundation for
constructing the universal “natural goodness-human nature” of a Confu-
cian morality of human rights.
Haiming Wen and William Keli’i Akina  167
II. Naturalist theoretical reconstruction of “Natural goodness-hu-
man nature”
As we have demonstrated, there emerged a naturalist theoretical
transformation when Neo-Confucian philosophers attempted to develop
the Mencius “human nature is good” into a “Natural goodness-human
nature” framework. This theoretical breakthrough may serve as a foun-
dation for our forthcoming reconstruction of a naturalist version of Con-
fucian morality of human rights. Just as the theoretical transformation of
these Neo-Confucians was motivated by the challenges of contemporary
Buddhism, a reconstruction of a Confucian morality of human rights is
motivated by challenges from the modern conception of human rights
and meta-ethics. Actually, what Neo-Confucians developed as the Mencius
“human nature is good” to be “natural goodness-human nature” structure
can be seen as a theoretical reconstruction for transforming moralism
into naturalism.  Thus an initial task for us will be to examine what is
necessary to provide this transformation with a modern philosophical face
to become a naturalist version.
From the traditional notion of religious-moral foundationalism,
natural goodness is the imitation of the goodness of God. God is the
complete good, so human goodness is a property of and reflection of the
goodness of God. Where religious foundationalism is not accepted, the
theologically sympathetic may look to a “God-constructed” naturalist ver-
sion of goodness.  However, in admitting that humans are not “as good as
they should be”, how can “natural goodness” be “good?”4  One way of
responding is to return to the natural law tradition. For example, Michael
J. Perry avers that the natural law of the morality of human rights is un-
tenable without the support of theology, or the existence of God (Perry,
2007: 19).
For those who look beyond the tradition of religious
foundationalism, the origin of morals is generally sought either within
natural science, or within the dynamic of secular life. Is it necessary to
build moral theories upon objective facts as with scientific theories?  Are
there moral facts?  Generally, morality and science have been considered
separate discourses (Shafer-Landau, 2003: 67). The classic “is vs. ought”
distinction, attributed to Enlightenment philosopher David Hume, enjoins
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scientists and philosophers alike not to confuse fact (that which is) with
value (that which ought to be). A similar, although substantively different
claim, was made by G. E. Moore in his recognition of the Naturalistic
Fallacy which incorrectly identifies what is “good” with whatever may be
preferential or bring greatest utility (Moore, 1903).  Ethical naturalism
considers moral facts to have causal powers, so ethical behaviors are all
natural facts and not non-natural facts. Moral realist Shafer-Landau claims
that moral facts possess the same ontological status as scientific facts
(Ibid., p. 55). His implication is that moral facts operate like scientific and
social facts such that they are similarly subject to the rigors of scientific
hypothesis testing.  Peter Railton considers that moral properties are ob-
jective, yet non-cognitive truths (Railton, 2007: 187). Shafer-Landau also
admits the objectivity of moral judgment, which is independent from per-
sonal thought, and can transcend the concreteness of time and space
(Shafer-Landau, 2003: 2). According to these forms of moral realism,
ethical normativity does not rely upon God (at least within secular ver-
sions), nor upon the existence of human beings, so moral facts are objec-
tive facts. However, Martha Nussbaum argues that the “should” in “how
humans should act” comes from care and compassion toward others who
are less fortunate (Nussbaum, 1996: 27). Rorty does not accept
Nussbaum’s Mencian way of incorporating an emotional foundation into
the determination of human nature as good, and he denies the concept of
universal human nature altogether.  For Rorty, morality is a construct
which relies upon “our Eurocentric human rights culture”, (Rorty, 1993:
126) a position criticized by Bernard Williams (Williams, 1983: 33).
While most versions of human rights fundamentalism, religious
or not, admit to the innate dignity of every human being, recent theories
have questioned the exceptionalism of homo-sapiens, such as Peter
Singer’s work in animal rights or recent advocacy of the rights of nature
itself as in the French ecologisme movement.  Contemporary science fic-
tion has also raised the spectre of robot-rights, when automatons achieve
some form of intellectual or moral sentience.
Yet, while most moral philosophers acknowledge that there are
many different kinds of moralities in modern and postmodern times, some,
like Michael J. Perry, assert that there is little impetus to fully banish
foundationalism or a place-holder for God, at least for pragmatic rea-
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sons.  As mentioned above, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
seems to reflect this tendency in its invoking of the term “endowed” with-
out stating by whom or what humans are “endowed” with rights.  Perry
agrees with Philippa Foot that most contemporary moral philosophers
rarely question the foundation of morals in the scathing way Nietzsche
did (Ibid., p. 23). In this regard, Philippa Foot claims that ‘natural’
goodness…is attributable only to living individuals and to their parts,
characteristics, and operations; and that it is an intrinsic or ‘autonomous’
goodness in that it depends directly on the relationship of an individual to
the ‘life form’ of its species”. (Foot, 2001: 26-7) Foot uses the concept of
necessity to explain “natural goodness” just as an oak needs a sturdy root
since “the good of the oak is its individual and reproductive life cycle”,
and this, according to Foot, requires the Aristotelian notion of necessity
(Ibid., 46). Human goodness is different from the goodness of animals
and plants (Ibid., 51) because humans have good minds, good natures
and do good deeds, animals and plants merely respond to their natural
environments. Ronald Dworkin considers human specialness to be based
on two basic facts concerning human beings: 1. Everyone is the highest
product of our natures; 2. the growth of each person is not just a product
of nature, but what humans actively achieve. Thus, no one should be
offended by others, for humans are unique in two distinct ways: their
natures and their human creativity (Dworkin, 1993: 82-3).
In contrast, most Neo-Confucians consider “what follows” as na-
ture, and “completing it is nature” as human creativity. For them, the
original meaning of this line in the Great Commentaries is to consider the
natural movement of heaven and earth to be good; and individual things
come into being because they receive their natures which are formed as
dao moves. This theoretical framework from the Goodness of the tiandao
天道 to the nature of human beings demonstrates that human nature and
rights come from a kind naturalist theory of goodness, and not the asser-
tive claim that human nature itself is originally good. The statement that
human nature is good may rest upon the dichotomy of good and evil,
such that it becomes a kind of assertive claim in the form of subjectivism
with simple judgments. On the contrary, a Confucian morality of human
rights possesses a naturalist foundation and moral facts like the dao of
heaven and earth (tiandi) 天地之道 is good. However, this good is not the
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“good vs. evil” good as in dualist metaphysics, but natural goodness. This
kind of naturalist goodness differs from the Aristotelian claim that “some
are goods in their own right” and “others goods because of these” (Irwin,
1999: 6, 1096b14-15).
Naturalist goodness can be traced back to commentaries on this
line by many Neo-Confucians. For example, Hu Yuan’s Commentaries on
the Book of Changes considers the tian to raise the myriad things as
natural (Hu, 1986: 466-7). Just as He Kai 何楷 uses the sense of Spring to
refer to the creativity of nature, and the goodness of nature is exactly like
the naturally growing grasses and trees. This is very similar to the Cheng
brothers’ claim that what sages did was to transform the good deeds of
heaven and earth into particular things, and complete the goodness within
human affairs (Cheng, 1981: 29). Zhang Zai claims that such goodness is
to describe the sustaining effort of humans’ succeeding the natural good
accomplishments of heaven and earth (Zhang, 1978: 187-8). In this way,
it is possible to take natural goodness as good deeds, so it is resonant
with natural cosmological sensibility of the Zhongyong and the Great
Commentaries. In short, Zhang Zai takes “goodness” to be the property
of the succeeding characteristic of the “good” dao (Ibid., 192). Cheng
Hao makes it clearer that dao is to be applied on the achievement and
function in succeeding the moving dao (Cheng, 1981: 135). Hence, “good-
ness” is a kind of functional characteristic of natural dao. Zhu Xi’s com-
mentaries on Zhou Dunyi’s Tongshu indicate that goodness starts out as
a natural pattern (li), even before it possesses its own name, so it comes
into its own being. Penetrating (tong) is to name this naturally self-form-
ing process”. (Zhu, 2001: 98) This is a kind of naturalist interpretation,
and the “goodness” of this creative process is the natural goodness in its
ontological sense.
When Zhu Xi answers his students’ questions, he claims that the
word succeeding (ji 继 ) refers to the incipient nature of movement, which
is both the end to stability and the starting point of motion (Zhu, 1994: 2).
This is to explain the succeeding (ji) from the perspective of the cosmo-
logical beginning and things which are about to come into beings (Zhu,
1986: 2388). Both Cai Qing and Lai Zhide in the Ming Dynasty clearly
define “goodness” as cosmological ontological being which transcends
concrete forms and materials. Wang Fuzhi also comments that succeed-
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ing (ji) is the moving horizon between the heavens and human beings
(Wang, 1988: 825).
Zhu Bokun considers this line to indicate that all things that suc-
ceed the pattern of yin-yang are perfect, and all natures are complete with
both yin and yang, so all natures are also perfect (Zhu, 1998: 79). Yang
Qingzhong points out that Zhu’s idea takes “goodness” to be perfect, and
not the goodness which is juxtaposed against evil (Yang, 2005: 217).
Thus, the perfect completeness of human being comes from the ontologi-
cal goodness of complete natural dao of tian. To claim that “human na-
ture is good” is just a kind of judgment concerning the completeness of
human nature. Along these lines, the good in “human nature is good” as
moral judgment should be based on the naturalist moral fact of the dao of
tian. Accordingly, the Confucian morality of human rights should be based
upon this version of moral judgment about “human nature is good”. In
this way, the goodness of human nature should not rely on any dogma-
tism, solipsism or subjectivism relating to particular religious foundations,
but on the “good” natural facts starting from the natural movement of
tiandao.  As such, this constitutes a theoretical version of naturalism.
III.Confucian natural morality and Western morality of human rights
Regardless of their theoretical differences, both the naturalist ver-
sion of rights in the Confucian “natural goodness-human nature” frame-
work and the Western traditional morality of human rights promote the
duty of humans to act morally according to their consciences and to re-
spect the human rights of others. Thus, the respect for human dignity
needs to be demonstrated in moral behaviors by each individual or com-
munally by moral actions.
Generally, the religious version of Western morality of human rights
based upon religious foundationalism is experienced by the believer as a
form of Divine Command Theory (DCT) and incorporates the episte-
mologies of natural law, known and evolved facts, the revealed scrip-
tures, religious experience, and supernatural experiences.  As for DCT,
human obedience is obligatory, and the commands come from God’s or-
ders, which supersede human authorities. This is often seen as a view of
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human freedom.  On the other hand, theistic morality is not always por-
trayed as external to individual will and conscience.  The problem of obey-
ing external law as opposed to internal conscience is a theme addressed
throughout the Judeo-Christian Scriptures, giving rise to an “internaliz-
ing” solution in the words of the prophet Jeremiah which allows the indi-
vidual to obey God autonomously: “I [God] will put my law in their minds
and write it on their hearts”. (Jeremiah 31:33 and Hebrews 10:16, New
International Version).  Nonetheless, even when the individual is free to
choose and endorse personal moral actions, how does the epistemology
of hearing or knowing the Will of God achieve consensus in a system
which fosters personal interpretation of the will of God.  In a pluralistic
society, individuals and communities, religious or not, must determine
what it means to act according to conscience, regardless of one’s reli-
gious belief as to what informs the conscience.
While there may be ineffability between differing interpretations
of God’s Will for theistic moral agents, there is no lack of potential con-
flict within the competing moral visions of non-theists.  Secular versions
of human rights may move society beyond theological foundations, but
the question of where to anchor moral values remains.  There are several
moral sources of human action in the naturalist version of Confucian
morality for human rights: the conscience one is born with and develops
from early life; sympathy based upon conscience which leads to a natural
moral sense and desires; community wisdom or social convention, which
is different from any transcendental theories; and, particularly important
in Confucian societies, and the canonical teachings of sages passed down
as part of family tradition and cultural values. All these sources rely, to
varying extent, on the ancient classics to provide moral wisdom and guid-
ance for life.  In what way, then, may we draw upon the classics to inform
our contemporary moral notions, especially with respect to human rights
morality?
One approach is to apply to our contemporary world the basic
concepts of virtue explicated in the classic texts, fostering a dialogue
with human rights thinking.  One of the most prominent virtues is the
notion of ai ren or “benevolent love”.  Irene Bloom believes that Mencius
recognizes the ideas of human equality, responsibility, relationship, and
dignity as compatible to virtues held by a consensus of modern civiliza-
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tions (Bloom, 1998: 94-116). Henry Rosemont opposes the assumption
of the autonomous individual in contemporary human rights thinking as
incompatible with the role-embedded individual in Confucian ethics and
political rights. Rosemont agrees with Roger Ames in establishing an al-
ternate vocabulary if Westerners want to discuss Confucian ethics and
politics (Rosemont, 1998: 55). Wejen Chang holds that contemporary
human rights thinking and the Confucian version of human rights are con-
ceptually compatible, and that they should be theoretically combined even
though they were rooted in different histories in practice (Chang, 1998:
134).
Chung-ying Cheng has theorized that the language of Confucian
virtues and duties may be translated into corresponding rights language
in that rights and duties are, in some ways, mirror-like corollaries. Ac-
cording to Professor Cheng, individuals-in-community should become
aware of their responsibilities (not just their rights) for the community
and for the public.  Since no one could be separated from her community,
this sensibility should motivate individuals to participate in public affairs
to the extent of their capacity. Extreme forms of public expression which
may result in rebellion might occur if individuals are given no recourse to
participate in public affairs properly. Cheng concludes that people have a
right to contend for freedom and for the practice of virtues by their lead-
ers (Cheng, 1998: 151). Along these lines, an important contribution of
the Confucian version of human rights, based on “natural goodness-hu-
man nature”, is the understanding of moral obligation. Confucian moral
obligation has no need of transcendent sources or commands, as it is
generated from socially defined moral roles, and it becomes morally obliga-
tory based upon non-particularistic, yet situational contexts.
Consequently, conflict may not always be avoidable between one’s
personal self- interests and social-political interests when the Confucian
“natural goodness-human nature” framework interacts with contempo-
rary human rights. There are several views on record for resolving this
type of conflict: Julia Ching holds that, as far as the circle of East-Asian
Confucian societies is concerned, the human rights situations in Japan,
South Korea, and Taiwan has experienced great improvement in the 20th
Century.  Human rights is an effective Chinese concept, Ching asserts, at
least in the following three aspects: 1) there is a Confucian version of
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human rights; 2) most East Asian countries recognize the idea of human
rights; and 3) there is no conflict between democratic practice and the
Confucian tradition in East Asian countries. Therefore, Ching concludes
that there is no essential conflict between the Western notion of human
rights and that of the Confucian tradition in theory; but conflict might
occur when political rights are interfered with by powerful authorities
(Ching, 1998, 67-82). D. W. Y. Kwok points out that to be a Confucian
person means to learn “rites”, but education in “rights” is often missed.
According to Kwok, all nations of Asia experienced numerous political
revolutions and transformations during the 20th Century, so no single form
of government and society can be said to be purely Confucian. The key to
developing and practicing Confucian human rights today depends upon
whether Confucianism’s advocates can enlarge the concept of “person”,
and provide the common people with legally insured rights (Kwok, 1998:
83-91). Randall Peerenboom is sensitive to the real Chinese situations in
which Communist Party leaders like Deng Xiaoping have emphasized the
unity of thought, and Confucian “rites”, Peerenboom also points out, are
not “rights”.  At the very least, rights exist to protect individuals and
minorities from unjust treatment by majorities (Peerenboom, 1998: 249-
253). Toward this end, China’s current leaders have on their plates the
need to address both the language and substance of rights as a primary
issue in the emerging China of the 21st Century. That there may be no
single solution for all countries can be seen in the fact that Taiwan and
Singapore are considered states with exemplary human rights practices,
yet their citizens do not enjoy the same freedoms of expression guaran-
teed by the United States Constitution’s First Amendment. Each country
will draw a different line in the balance between individual rights and the
needs of the majority and state.
The Confucian naturalist framework of “natural goodness-human
nature” offers practical aide to the human rights situations in contempo-
rary Chinese society.  The recognition of the indigenous place of human
rights in Chinese thought enables today’s China to embrace human rights
as authentically Chinese.  This is significant as China interacts with West-
ern and other nations which appeal to human rights as a universal stan-
dard by which to judge the legitimacy of all political regimes.  Confucian-
derived human rights theory and practice ensure that the call to human
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rights is not a foreign imposition but an embracing of ancient and classi-
cal Chinese heritage.  Nationally sponsored research into the cultural roots
of human rights in China, via Confucian studies, also positions China to
become a major contributor to and authority on human rights as a global
dialogue.
As the course of history and Chinese civilization has shown, Con-
fucianism may be co-opted by authorities, whether governmental or reli-
gious, as a form of social control.  Many human rights abuses in Chinese
history have been attributed to Confucianism for this reason, including
the subjugation of women through practices such as foot-binding or po-
lygamy.  Conservative political movements have often justified corrup-
tion by appeal to Confucian rites and values.  What is important to keep
in mind is that none of this has truly represented the spirit of Confucian-
ism which advocates for the individual and the powerless in society.  Au-
thentic Confucianism, derived from the canonical texts, rather than from
social customs, has produced the highest levels of intellectual advance-
ment and freedom in China’s history.  Examples of these ideals include
the aesthetic developments of intellects pursuing personal freedom in the
Wei-Jin Dynasties, the robust individuality of characters in literature such
as the Dreams of Red Chamber, historical novels like Three Kingdom
Romance and All Men are Brothers, where personal characters are dis-
tinctive and rise above corrupted social values. The Confucian “natural
goodness-human nature” framework inspires individuals to fight for hu-
man rights as rights to be defended for one’s community and social con-
text.
Traditionally, the Confucian practice of morality of human rights
stresses the consistency of personal behavior and social circumstance,
negating one’s selfish desires from “conquering oneself” (keji ??), to “ex-
tinguish one’s personal desire (mie renyu ???), and disregarding one’s
own rights in order to be recognized by authoritarian or ritualized soci-
ety, and fulfilling the value of “goodness” in social norms. There is an
historical embedded-ness to many of the traditional concepts associated
with Confucianism. Yet, change has been a constant factor in China’s
long history, and change in customs and practices has occurred with the
social expression of Confucianism. Contemporary Chinese society has
much room within it for the revisioning of Confucian social practice, es-
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pecially with the Confucian naturalist version of “natural goodness-hu-
man nature” framework as it is disseminated and put into practice.
In traditional Confucian society, “rites” are demanding require-
ments for persons, and the ethical standards or norms for individuals who
will be engaged in society. It is a Confucian view that rites are helpful in
sustaining stability and family and community well-being, so there is a
temptation for leaders to practice authoritarianism in ensuring that people
follow ritual systems. However, “rites” might not always accommodate
the moral “goodness” of human nature, so sometimes following rites be-
comes a social requirement for purposes other than the well-being of the
individual.5  In this way, at the individual level, “rites” and “rights” may
actually work in two opposite directions. “Rites” are limitations upon
individual freedoms for the purpose of sustaining the community.  “Rights”
are limitations on the greater community in order to sustain the freedoms
of the individual.  This is one of the many challenges facing any measure
of social change within China.
The authors are confident that, on the public level, it is possible
for China to develop a naturalist version of Confucian morality of “natu-
ral goodness-human nature” that is consistent with both tradition and
contemporary reality in Chinese culture as it dialogues with the Western
conception human rights.6  The conflict between individual freedoms and
social good will require a careful weighing of input from citizens at all
levels. Some theories have been developed to solve this kind of conflict
such as the traditional “dao of rules and rectangles (xieju zhi dao ????)”,
Yang Fu translates John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty to be “a theory of the
rights and demarcations between community and individuals (qunji quanjie
????)”. Whatever the theoretical foundation, practical tools will be neces-
sary for widespread understanding and equitable practice. While many
scholars have realized that the practice of the Western notion of human
rights in East Asian countries should not be indiscriminately transplanted
into the Chinese mainland, nor should there be a wholesale importing of
Western ideology and legal mechanisms, the West provides significant
historical and philosophical resources. Nonetheless, China will have to
set its own pace for any political transformation and will need to refine its
own ideology, not based upon Western foundations for human rights doc-
trine, but building upon Confucian morality of “natural goodness-human
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nature”.  This may one day lead to a fully developed Confucian theory of
human rights both based on traditional Confucianism and in response to
Western notions of human rights.
Conclusion
Compared with previous religious, scientific or secular versions,
the naturalist framework of Confucian morality for “natural goodness-
human nature” appears to provide a more universal and pragmatic ap-
proach to human rights for China (Zhang, 2009: 483-92.).7  Based on the
hermeneutical tradition of the line “what follows the dao is good, and
what dao forms is nature (jishan chengxing)”, the authors have offered a
Confucian naturalist version of human rights in this article. We have come
to recognize that the freedom of Confucian individuals is based upon the
“natural goodness-human nature” of the dao of tian/heavens. To put this
in terms of the naturalist framework, “natural goodness-human nature”
provides the theoretical foundation for “good” Confucian moral actions.
And it is based on this naturalist “natural goodness-human nature” frame-
work that Confucians encourage all people to cultivate their natures to be
better persons, and “rest in the utmost good” in the end. The process of
cultivating natural goodness starting from human nature is a process of
choosing “good” actions based on naturalist “natural goodness-human
nature”.  From this perspective, humans possess rights when they make
“good” choices in order to fulfill their natures (chengxing ??). This fol-
lows from the Confucian naturalist version of human rights which corre-
sponds to the Western idea of God-endowed human rights.  These two
theories, each of which works in its respective venue, offer a basis for
comparison, contrast, and synthesis between China and the West in the
area of human rights and social philosophy.
Endnotes
1Haiming Wen, Associate Professor, Renmin University of China, Special-
ties: Chinese Philosophy and Comparative Philosophy. William Keli’i Akina, Ad-
junct Professor of Philosophy and Humanities, University of Hawaii at Manoa __
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Department of Philosophy, and Hawaii Pacific University __ Department of Humani-
ties. Specialties: Ethics, Chinese Philosophy and Comparative Philosophy. This re-
search is supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities,
and the Research Funds of Renmin University of China, also Supported by Program
for New Century Excellent Talents (NCET), Chinese Ministry of Education. The
authors thank Chung-ying Cheng, Tu Wei-ming, Zhang Xuezhi, Liang Tao, Yang
Xusheng, Chen Ming, Fang Xudong, Bai Tongdong, Zhou Lian, Xie Maosong, Liu
Sumin, and Ren Feng for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
2Nietzsche published The Gay Science in 1882, and proposed “Gott ist todt”
in its vol. 3, 108 (1988a?S. 467).
3In July 1998, 120 members of the United Nations voted to pass the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), often referred to simply as the
Rome Statute. Subsequently, the first international penal court was established at the
Hague, in Holland. The Rome Statute has been in effect since July 2002, with 119
official parties and 139 signatories.  See United Nations Treary Collection, Data-
bases, at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=
XVIII-10&chapter=18&lang=en., downloaded 11/1/11. China was initially active in
the early development of the Rome Statute, yet has not signed onto nor approved it.
4This question also emerges within Christian theology as an implication of
the Doctrine of the Fallenness of Man, which states not that humans are everywhere
“as bad as they could be”, but rather, that they are nowhere “as good as they should
be”. For St. Paul, this condition of humanity has direct bearing upon the moral evalu-
ation of nature. For even with his general acceptance of Platonic dualism, St. Paul
does not isolate humanity and nature into separate compartments, but instead im-
putes upon nature the fallenness of man: “For the creation was subjected to frustra-
tion, not by its own choice…” (Romans 8:20a, New International Version)
5Thus, Confucius emphasizes the need for truthful feeling (i.e., being au-
thentic) when practicing ritual propriety, especially because of the human tendency
to place social requirements above personal feelings.
6Although the Western view that all humans are born with equal human
rights takes the form of a naturalist claim similar to the one argued in this paper for
Confucianism, the history of Western human rights shows that what is now consid-
ered natural or even secular has been strongly influenced by dualist transcendence at
its origin.  The Confucian naturalist view described in this paper differs from the
Western view as it holds that, to perpetuate what is natural goodness is to succeed the
dao of yin __ yang.  Thus the Confucian naturalist perspective does not depend upon
a transcendental point of view.
7Zhang Xianglong regards Confucianism to be a typical non-universalism
because it considers truths to be intrinsically correlated with the changing processes
of our ordinary lives. Accordingly, the Confucian perspective appears to be lively and
active when it contributes to a healthy cultural environment and denies the necessity
of universal values derived from the standards that operate on higher than everyday
life. His conclusion is drawn from the perspective of the communication of Confu-
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cianism with other cultures. This being said, it is still possible for Confucianism to
provide a relatively universal version of the morality of human rights even though
Confucianism is typically famous for its non-universalism in cultural dialogue.
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